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Introduction
Concern for the environment is nothing new, in 
New Zealand and elsewhere. The roots of the modern 
environmental movement (or movements) are many and 
diverse, including concerns about the loss of wild nature, 
the health risks of industrial society, the effects of large scale 
pesticide use, the misuse of animals in the fur trade, “factory 
farming”, and research and product testing. However, the 
term environmental ethics is quite recent; the earliest 
reference of which I am aware is a 1973 paper by Richard 
Routley. He argued that the central flaw in conventional 
ethics is that because of its anthropocentric assumptions 
it cannot attribute value to anything except as a means to 
human ends. In particular, we lack an ethic “setting out 
people’s relations to the natural environment” or in Aldo 
Leopold’s words “an ethic dealing with man’s relations to 
land and to the animals and plants which grow upon it” 
(Routley 1973, p. 205, quoting Leopold 1966, p. 238). 
The first half of this article consists of an overview of the 
main elements in secular “Western” environmental ethics; I 
then relate it to New Zealand, suggesting that a distinctive 
New Zealand environmental ethic is developing that in its 
way is almost as unique as our land.
Environmental ethics: an overview
Anthropocentrism is the view that human interests are 
all that matters. Environmental policies and practices are 
justified to the extent that they promote human interests. 
Only humans have intrinsic value - that is, are valuable as 
ends in themselves. Everything else, including animals, 
plants, forests, wetlands and mountains are resources, valuable 
only instrumentally, as means to the ends of humans. It is 
often argued that the Judaeo-Christian tradition is highly 
anthropocentric (White, 1967). 
Newly arrived settlers are typically motivated by short-
term anthropocentrism: they arrive, often from a deprived 
background, to find a land with lush forests and vast 
populations of game, and seas teeming with fish. Resources 
appear unlimited and are exploited accordingly. If there is 
gold, there will be a gold rush. 
Colonial settlers typically fail to appreciate the special 
character of their new home. As Jared Diamond (2006) 
argues, they assume that land management systems that 
worked back home will work in the newly colonized 
land. Australia is perhaps the most egregious example of 
environmental disaster caused by an unthinking attempt 
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to apply European land use patterns to a totally different 
environment. Today, most Australian farmers are technically 
bankrupt, surviving only because they are subsidized to 
engage in what is essentially extractive agriculture.
However, not everyone is interested only in short-term 
gain, hence the increasing influence of what may be called 
long-term anthropocentrism, sustainable use or sustainable 
management. Farmers and foresters in areas such as most 
of Western and Northern European, Bali, Japan, much of 
China, Tonga and areas of Central and South America have 
been operating on sustainable use principles for millennia. 
Nobody knows whether preliterate farmers and foresters 
had a conservation ethic; but certainly they learned early 
enough how to get it right. The first articulated sustainable 
use ethic (indeed, the first use of the term “conservation” 
in this sense) is in the writings of Gifford Pinchot (1865-
1946), who founded the US Forest Service and Yale School 
of Forestry. Pinchot developed the science-based view of 
conservation as “wise use” based on a utilitarian view of 
nature as a resource to be managed wisely so as to provide 
maximum utility in the long term.  This greatly influenced 
the New Zealand Forest Service policy in the direction of 
multiple use and sustainable yield. 
By a historical accident, the first publications on what 
became the branch of philosophy known as environmental 
ethics were not about “the environment” at all but about the 
welfare and rights of animals, as part of a historical moral 
progression, frequently called “moral extensionism” (Rodman 
1983). This is based on the idea that ethical systems vary 
to just in their precepts or rules (“Do not kill”) but also in 
who is covered by them or their extension (“Do not kill 
any human”). Moral progress in this sense consists not in 
recognizing new rights, but in extending existing rights to 
more beings. Moral status has progressively been extended 
to all humans regardless of race, colour, nationality, religion, 
sex or age, including future generations. More recently, some 
philosophers and others have argued for a further extension 
of moral status to animals. 
The most influential living philosopher is Peter Singer. 
In Animal Liberation (1975) he notes that racism and 
sexism are justly condemned because such discrimination 
systematically ignores the interests of women and minorities 
in favour of the interests of the dominant group. There 
is no justification for refusing to take equal account 
of the interests of all humans; rather, there is a moral 
obligation to give equal weight to equal interests. Similarly, 
a being’s interests should count equally, regardless of 
species. Utilitarianism, the ethical theory to which Singer 
subscribes, acknowledges that all sentient beings (that is, 
beings that can feel pleasure and pain) have an equal interest 
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in avoiding suffering, and the wrongfulness of inflicting 
suffering on any sentient beings without justification. Our 
exploitation of animals for food and the like is therefore 
condemned as “speciesism”. 
As a foundation for environmental ethics, animal 
liberation has not found wide acceptance, though it paved 
the way for the idea that morality is not just about relations 
between humans. To some, it has been condemned as simply 
substituting one arbitrary cut off point for another. Why 
should moral considerability begin only at the level of 
sentience? Many people value forests, shorelines and lakes 
and believe it is morally wrong to damage them but few 
regard them as sentient. Others (e.g. Gunn 1980) have noted 
that because species membership is irrelevant to moral status 
for animal liberationists, the theory cannot account for the 
special value that we attribute to members of endangered 
species. However, for most people, the rarer a species, the 
more we value each individual member. But the protection 
of ecosystems or endangered species sometimes requires 
management techniques that are unacceptable to animal 
liberationists. Hence, in the US, animal liberationists and 
environmentalists have frequently found themselves at 
loggerheads over issues such as control of pests or culling 
of excessive populations of herbivores in order to protect 
fragile ecosystems.
Aldo Leopold (1887 - 1948) a forester by training and 
an environmental manager by profession, is often regarded 
as “the father of environmental ethics”. He was not the 
first to think holistically about land use and resource 
management - it is the normal worldview in traditional 
societies. His great innovation was to apply the science of 
ecology to ethics. Leopold did not simply extend ethical 
concern to the environment, but developed a new paradigm 
or worldview. Mainstream “Western” thought views ethics 
as concerned only with relations between individuals and 
between individuals and society. Moreover, ethics was based 
on the premise that humans are essentially egoistic: ethics 
is a device for restraining their egoistic desires in order 
that everyone may prosper. Leopold rejected individualism, 
proposing instead that we think in terms of the “biotic 
pyramid” and hence attach value to the “biotic community”: 
“The Land ethic simply enlarges the boundaries of the 
community to include soils, waters, plants and animals or 
collectively, the land” (Leopold 1966, p. 239).
Thus, 
In short, a land ethic changes the role of Homo sapiens 
from conqueror of the land-community to plain 
member and citizen of it. It implies respect for his 
fellow-members, and also respect for the community 
as such. (p. 240)
The land is to be valued not as a commodity, but for 
its own sake:
…..quit thinking about decent land-use as solely an 
economic problem. Examine each question in terms 
of what is ethically and esthetically right, as well as 
what is economically expedient. A thing is right when 
it tends to preserve the integrity, stability, and beauty 
of the biotic community. It is wrong when it tends 
otherwise. (p. 262)
Increasing numbers of philosophers are willing to 
ascribe intrinsic value, moral status or even rights to 
individual plants, natural features, lakes, rivers, mountains, 
and rocks (Nash 1977, Stone 1974, Taylor 1986). Others 
have argued that the whole approach of extensionism is 
fundamentally flawed. American philosophers Callicott 
(1980), Norton (1986) and Rodman (1983) have all 
questioned the legitimacy of attempting to understand 
and resolve environmental issues in terms of the value of 
individual entities, arguing that an environmental ethic 
should be concerned with the good of ecosystems or of the 
planet as a whole. For reasons noted above, the land ethic, 
and other holistic approaches, is usually seen as incompatible 
with animal liberation (Callicott 1980, Sagoff 1984). Thus its 
proponents have been criticized as ignoring the well-being 
of individual animals for the good of systems, and dubbed 
“environmental fascists” (Regan 1983, p. 362). 
All the philosophers whose views have so far been 
presented are united in rejecting anthropocentrism: 
they deny that an ethic that takes account only of human 
interests can be the basis of adequate environmental policy. 
Anthropocentrism is central to the dominant paradigm 
of exploitation and therefore the main obstacle to be 
overcome. Some environmental philosophers explain this 
by distinguishing between “shallow” and “deep” ecology, 
terms coined by the influential Norwegian philosopher 
Arne Naess (1973, 1984). Shallow or reformist ecology is 
concerned with ameliorating the effects of environmental 
exploitation, for instance pollution control and landscape 
rehabilitation, the promotion of measures to enable us to 
continue our present lifestyles essentially unchanged via 
minor changes such as recycling and replacement of fossil 
fuels by biomass fuels, and the extension of the moral 
community to include favoured species such as animals that 
resemble humans, species that are cute, furry or impressive, 
and natural features that have special significance to 
humans. Like Leopold, deep ecologists advocate a change in 
our attitude to the environment from being consumers and 
exploiters to becoming members of the biotic community: 
not an extension of the moral community, but a paradigm 
shift, so that ecological wholes are valued in and for 
themselves. Naess (1984, p.302) explains his starting point 
thus: “The well-being of nonhuman life on earth has value 
in itself. This value is independent of any instrumental 
usefulness for limited human purposes.” Only if we adopt 
such a view will we have any reason to preserve substantial 
areas of earth in anything like their natural state.
Over the past two decades, ecofeminism has become 
increasingly influential. Ecofeminists believe that there 
are essential features of our thinking and practice that are 
common to all forms of discrimination and exploitation. 
Patsy Hallen maintains that domination of women by men 
and domination of nature are closely linked historically, 
conceptually and psychologically.
Sexism is the expression of a basic pathology of 
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domination and repression. Ecological imbalance 
is, in part, due to our mistaken belief that we can 
successfully dominate nature. So sexism (mind and 
body pollution) is fundamentally linked to ecological 
destructiveness (environmental pollution).
Hallen 1987, p.111
She believes that because science is the dominant 
means of understanding the environment, science needs 
to be transformed by feminism. She does not believe that 
women “have a specific essential nature that differentiates 
them from men” but that “women’s experience…has been 
more involved with nurturing than men’s” (p. 109). Like 
other ecofeminists, she believes that more women scientists 
will ensure that a feminist perspective is brought to bear 
on our understanding of the world, but on its own this is 
not enough. The “ideology of detachment and domination” 
that is central to modern science needs to change. Most 
importantly, the experience of women emphasizes wholes 
and relations, rather than separate individuals and 
dualism, and is therefore central to the development of 
deep ecology.
What good is environmental ethics?
Bryan Norton (1991, p. ix) writes, of the diversity of 
views among environmentalists,
This babel of voices leaves environmentalists ill equipped to 
build a unified conception of environmental management 
and it hampers them in communications with the general 
public. How can they propose a unified and integrated 
conception of environmental management, a blueprint 
for living in harmony with nature, if they cannot accept a 
common language in which to express it?
Norton is sceptical of high level theorizing and argues for 
a pragmatic approach, emphasizing the need for agreement 
about environmentally sound action. An insistence on 
“getting the theory right” can be an obstacle to “getting 
the practice right”. In his keynote address to the Melbourne 
Environmental Justice Conference in 1997, Naess used a 
striking metaphor. The environmentalist frontier, he said, 
is a very long one, and needs every soldier who is willing to 
defend it, whatever their reason for wanting to do so.
For an environmental ethic to be effective in guiding 
the behaviour of billions of people, many of them living in 
poverty, it will need to be seen to offer them some benefit. 
However, what is largely missing from the literature 
is a concern for the well-being of humans, especially 
deprived people in poor countries and indeed in most rich 
countries. Developing nations are urged to preserve their 
rainforests and reduce CFC and carbon dioxide emissions 
in the interests of preserving the “global heritage” of 
biodiversity and the ozone layer and preventing global 
warming. But many people in those countries consider 
anti-development arguments that begin with the premise 
that tropical forests are part of a global heritage to be no 
more than neo-colonialist attempts to promote Northern 
economic interests under the pretence of concern for the 
global environment. An environmental ethic should surely 
take account of the needs of all humans. 2
Unique New Zealand
The issues mentioned in the introduction - loss of wild 
nature, pollution and health risks, factory farming - of are 
concerns in New Zealand, but the focus has been particularly 
on the loss of undeveloped coasts, native forests, biodiversity, 
wetlands and scenic and amenity values. This is probably 
because we have stronger ties to the outdoors than do people 
in most other developed countries. Most New Zealanders 
live within an hour of the coast, and are reasonably close to 
at least a semi-natural area of native forest. 
Moreover, the development of a New Zealand 
environmental ethic has been unique, because of the many 
features that make New Zealand itself unique. I regularly 
lecture internationally on environmental ethics in New 
Zealand, and most of the audience is surprised to learn 
that New Zealand:
• Is the most isolated and longest isolated large land 
mass.
• Was separated from the rest of the world before 
marsupials. mammals and birds evolved.
• Is the most recently settled, and most recently colonized, 
large land mass.
• Within a similar area to Malaysia, the UK or New 
Mexico, includes a range of environments that includes 
sub-Antarctic islands, taiga and sub-tropical islands, as 
well as the mountains, beaches and forests that feature 
on travel posters.
• Has unique fauna such as alpine parrots and sub-tropical 
penguins.
• Has lost more species than any other large land mass and 
has the highest proportion of threatened or endangered 
bird species.
• Is under relentless threat from a bewildering variety of 
introduced pest fauna and flora.
•  Is mostly highly modified, with only 25% of its original 
forest, and 10% of its original wetland remaining.
• Apart from possibly a few offshore islands, has no areas 
that have not been substantially modified.
• Leads the world in restoration ecology, especially island 
restoration (including, increasingly, “mainland islands”) 
and captive breeding and release of endangered species. 
Environmental ethics in New Zealand
As in all colonies, European arrivals to New Zealand 
were generally motivated by short-term anthropocentrism, 
the goal being to exploit the available resources as profitably 
as possible. This worldview is sometimes referred to as a 
“cowboy” or “frontier” ethic (Schrader-Frechette 1981, 
p. 31). Many colonists intended to make their fortune in 
New Zealand and return “home”. Timber, gold and whales 
were valuable resources but forest (especially lowland 
forest) clearance was desirable to make land available for 
agriculture. Wetlands and other vegetation cover (widely 
referred to as “scrub” or “rubbish” when I arrived in 1969) 
2 This paragraph originally appeared in Gunn 1994.
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was negatively valued and again clearance and drainage were 
necessary in order to make the land “productive”.  
At first glance it appears that Maori were similarly 
motivated. They burned off around 25% of the forests, 
including almost all lowland forest of both North and South 
Islands (Grayson, 2001: 9). It is not known how much was 
deliberate, for horticulture and to encourage the growth of 
ferns, and how much accidental. It seems clear that Maori 
hunted Moa (and other bird species) to extinction: at one 
South Island site the remains of up to 90 000 birds have 
been found (King, 2003: 63) and between 100 and 150 years 
after their arrival, “the big game was almost exhausted” 
(King 2003: 66). 
The documented effects of Maori on the indigenous 
fauna provide one of the main bases for the overhunting 
theory of the extinction of Palaeolithic megafauna.
However, it would be a mistake to conclude that Maori 
were interested only in short-term gain. In due course they 
developed a conservationist way of life, presumably because 
they wanted to pass on resources to future generations. 
Moreover, as we shall see, te ao Maori, the Maori world-
view, is not primarily anthropocentric; perhaps it developed 
partly in response to the realization that resources were not 
unlimited. 
Although Australia has been called the lucky country, 
from a land use perspective New Zealand has been luckier. 
Our settlers were, no doubt, just as motivated by short term 
as were theirs. Our pioneer farmers would have been just as 
ignorant as theirs, just as prone to suppose that European 
land management practices would work in a totally different 
environment, and were even more inclined to introduce 
what would quickly become pest fauna and flora.  But it 
has turned out to be much easier to develop sustainable 
management in New Zealand than in Australia.  The long 
term anthropocentric ethic can be practised with more 
hope of success here.  Much of our farming and plantation 
forestry and maybe some fisheries are sustainable, and it is 
even conceivable that some natural native forests could be 
managed for sustainable use. If so, this ethic would permit 
the harvesting of selected trees for luxury items with high 
added value. Of course, there are many other resources that 
can be managed and internationally marketed according 
to an anthropocentric conservation ethic, including niche 
products such as green lipped mussels, organic avocadoes, 
activated manuka honey and possum fur products. 
Animal liberation has not made much progress in New 
Zealand. Singer’s main influence in New Zealand appears 
to have been on diet - many of my vegetarian students have 
told me that reading Singer’s work introduced them to the 
idea of ethical vegetarianism. However, animal liberation is 
incompatible with pest control. But most New Zealanders 
value forests and special individual trees such as Tane 
Mahuta, the best known tree in New Zealand. Far from 
respecting the interests of pests such as possums, rabbits, 
rats, mice and stoats, we place a negative value on them and 
support efforts to eradicate them even if the methods used 
cause some suffering.  There is very wide support for the 
restoration of islands such as Tiritiri Matangi (Supporters 
of Tiritiri Matangi Inc. has over 1400 members) and the 
creation of mainland islands such as the Karori Sanctuary 
(with over 15 000 members) and Maungautatari Ecological 
Island (with 1350 members) - much of the resources for these 
and other conservation projects is paid for from taxation and 
donations, and much labour is provided by volunteers.  
The only major pest control controversy is over the 
Kaimanawa horses. These animals cause immense damage 
to the mostly tussock environment that they occupy. 
However, this is a special case.  New Zealanders value forests 
for reasons such as their aesthetic and amenity value, but 
they do not generally value the scenery of the Desert Road. 
Furthermore, for many people, the “wild” (actually feral) 
horses are romantic, iconic and beautiful, unlike rodents 
and possums.   
According to the Report of the Royal Commission 
on Genetic Modification (2001), there are three main 
“worldviews” that are the sources of environmental values 
in A/NZ. These are the Judaeo-Christian ethic, secular 
environmental ethics, and te ao Maori. The Maori word 
used as a translation of “ethics” is tikanga. This does not 
mean the same as ethics in the Western philosophical sense, 
which is largely theoretical and critical. “Tikanga” means 
custom, habitual ways of doing things, though it is strongly 
normative. A person who does not obey tikanga does not 
merely act differently from what is customary but diverges 
from normal, acceptable behaviour. Respect for tikanga is 
a central feature of criminal justice and health policy and 
practice as well as environmental management in New 
Zealand (Ministry of Justice 2001).
Unlike the monotheist religions and traditional secular 
thought, te ao Maori does not separate humans from the 
rest of nature. Plants, trees, birds and humans were directly 
created by the god Tane, and thus are all related to each 
other. Fish and reptiles were created by Tangaroa, god of 
waters, and cultivated foods by Rongo, but since they and 
Tane are brothers it follows that all living things are kin. 
This provides a strong basis for care for the environment. 
The basic social unit in Maori society is the whanau or 
extended family, so in a sense all living things are part of 
our family. Moreover, Maori feel a responsibility not just to 
avoid harming kin, but positively, to help them. If a member 
of your whanau has helped a member of my whanau at some 
stage, and the opportunity arises for me to help a member 
of yours, I ought to do so. This is an aspect of utu, balance 
(Ministry of Justice 2001).
It follows, therefore that, based on kinship, we ought 
to avoid unnecessary environmental harm, and where 
possible to do good, to help our kin to thrive. We also ought 
to put right the results of past harms, even if we did not 
personally cause them, just as we have duties to help our 
human relatives who may have been harmed, regardless of 
who caused the harm (Patterson 1994)
Two key concepts in Maori ethics that have found their 
way into everyday speech are tapu and mauri. “Tapu” is often 
translated as “sacred” or “forbidden”. Thus a waahi tapu is a 
sacred place, and a rahui tapu is a declaration that a place or 
resource not be accessed - for instance, if someone drowns 
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off a beach, a rahui tapu will usually be declared on fishing 
or shellfish harvesting for a period. The human head is tapu 
in the sense that it must not normally be touched. “Mauri” 
is often translated as “life force”. A person or other being has 
mauri as long as he or she is alive, and death occurs when 
mauri departs. Still, these definitions are something of an 
oversimplification, and non-living things and ecosystems 
can also have mauri (Morgan 2004).  What both concepts 
have in common (Patterson. 1994, thinks they are possibly 
interchangeable) is that everything has its own essence, 
nature or character which makes it what it is and must 
be respected. For instance, a carver planning to create a 
particular carving will seek wood that has the right grain 
and texture for the object it is to depict; conversely, one 
may find a piece of driftwood with sinuous grain that looks 
just right for a carving of a fish. This is its mauri (Toia and 
Couper 2006).
Since natural objects and systems have their own 
character, they should be respected too. Thus, on the Maori 
view, they are not ours to do with as we please: we should 
work with nature and not try to turn it into something that 
is inconsistent with its character. This has implications 
for land use; for instance, respect for the character of steep 
volcanic slopes with light soil requires us not to clear 
the trees and cause erosion. If we nonetheless do clear 
the trees and plant crops or build houses, we will have 
upset the balance of nature. Eventually, we will suffer the 
consequences of our foolishness - our crops or buildings 
will be washed away by heavy rains - another example of 
utu (Ministry of Justice 2001).
Perhaps the most controversial concept is kaitiakitanga, 
usually translated, accurately, as stewardship or guardianship. 
A steward or guardian is someone who is appointed to take 
care of something by someone who has the authority (mana) 
to do so. For Maori, this authority ultimately comes from 
the gods, though usually, of course, through layers of 
intermediaries (Patterson 2000). 
The controversy has arisen because in the Resource 
Management Act 1991 it is implied, and in the works of 
writers such as Patterson stated, that kaitiakitanga can be 
generalized as the responsibility we all have to be “caretakers 
of the systems in which … we work, live and play” (1994, p. 
406). “Caretaker” is a synonym for steward. In the Judaeo-
Christian and Islamic traditions, humans are stewards of the 
earth, having been appointed to take care of it on behalf of 
God, its creator and owner. Stewardship exists in a secular 
context - every company manager is a steward for the 
owners, commonly the shareholders - and guardians can be 
appointed by courts to take care of minors. But only if God 
or gods exist can humans be kaitiaki of the earth, since the 
concept depends on someone having the mana to appoint 
them. You cannot just declare yourself to be a steward. The 
Resource Management Act refers to kaitiakitanga as if it 
can be exercised by any resource manager, but many Maori 
lawyers are concerned that this trivializes the concept by 
removing its essential ties to tikanga Maori. 
The Treaty of Waitangi (1840), between a number 
of paramount chiefs and the British Crown, guarantees 
Maori sovereignty - rangatiratanga. The rangatira was 
the chieftain of a tribe. Some Maori consider that this 
was meant to include political and legal authority, and 
advocate for a separate Maori legislature and judicial 
system. More commonly, it is seen as focused on control 
of the management of natural resources. Successful claims 
under the Treaty of Waitangi Act 1975 have been brought 
for the return of (or financial compensation for) land that 
was confiscated in the 19th century; a share of fishing 
quotas; and radio and television frequencies (which were 
natural resources in 1840 even though nobody recognized 
them as such). 
Some Maori have therefore argued that, for instance, 
native species should be managed in the traditional manner, 
by iwi (tribal) authorities. The iwi was the highest level of 
authority; there was no pan-Maori authority. Because of 
NZ’s distinctive topography - central mountains running 
north-south with river valleys running east and west - the 
boundaries of an iwi were usually catchment based, which 
made for holistic environmental management (and is the 
ecological basis of regional government). 
The increasing presence of Maori concepts such as 
rangatiratanga and kaitiakitanga, and especially of the 
principles of the Treaty of Waikato, in legislation, planning 
and management, the recognition of Maori customary rights 
and title, the number of kohanga reo (preschools where only 
Maori is spoken), the increasingly availability of culturally 
appropriate practices in the health system suggest that New 
Zealand society is moving towards at least a partial fusion 
of Pakeha and Maori culture.
Conclusion
In the writings of deep ecologists it is often implied 
that a concern to preserve nature is necessarily inconsistent 
with an anthropocentric view that puts a high value on the 
promotion of human well-being. But it may be that, in the 
long term, human well-being is best promoted by avoiding 
a complete transformation of the earth to suit short term 
human demands. Norton (1986) argues persuasively that 
most writers on environmental ethics have falsely assumed 
that conservation, in the sense of sustainable resource use, 
must be identified with anthropocentrism, a commitment 
to putting human interests first, while preservation, 
in the sense of protecting an area or a species from the 
disruptive consequences of human use, is identified with 
non-anthropocentrism. But intelligent anthropocentrists, 
to the extent that they take the long view, will acknowledge 
the need to protect the essential features of the biosphere 
- air, land, water and biodiversity - and therefore to preserve 
significant areas in their natural state rather than developing 
the whole earth for production. This is a requirement 
of sustainable management, the overriding goal of the 
Resource Management Act.
I believe that a distinctive New Zealand environmental 
ethic is emerging. It will be influenced by globalized ideas 
of environmental ethics (though not particularly by animal 
liberation) but will be shaped primarily by the cultural heritage 
and shared experiences of both European and Maori. 
feature
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